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ARBITRATION REVISITED:
PREEMPTION OF CALIFORNIA’S
UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
AFTER CONCEPCION
DAVID FRIEDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Courts have often been called upon to resolve conflicts between
state law and federal arbitration. In 1925, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a legislative framework for
1
enforcing arbitration agreements throughout the United States. The
2
rationale was twofold. First, Congress wanted to abolish the deep3
seated “common law hostility” toward arbitration. Second, it sought
4
to mandate enforcement of arbitration by the states. Toward these
ends, Section 2 of the FAA made arbitration agreements generally
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” unless a court found contractual
5
grounds for revocation. These “grounds” came to be understood as
generally applicable contract defenses, typically the province of state
6
law, but applying the law proved difficult.
Under the Supremacy Clause, federal regulation preempts
7
conflicting state law. This means that state laws which frustrate the
8
purposes of Congress must yield. In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempted California’s
unconscionability doctrine because it was an obstacle to federal

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2017, Duke University School of Law.
1. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2015)).
2. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
6. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (describing a
number of challenges to arbitration generally).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
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9

regulation. After Concepcion, however, federal and state courts were
still sharply divided on the interpretation of arbitration agreements
10
that specifically invoked state law.
This Commentary discusses the consequences of Concepcion and
its implications in Imburgia v. DIRECTV, a similar case where the
California Court of Appeal refused to enforce an arbitration
agreement under the doctrine of unconscionability. Part I summarizes
the factual background in Imburgia. Part II explores the legislative
and statutory bases for the Supreme Court’s ruling. Part III explains
the California Court of Appeal’s rationale and holding. Part IV
presents the specific arguments put forth by the Petitioner and
Respondent. Part V analyzes the facts in light of the arbitration
agreement’s plain meaning, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Concepcion, and public policy and concludes the Court should reverse
the lower court and hold that federal preemption applies.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondents Amy Imburgia and Kathy Greiner
(“Imburgia”) were customers of Defendant-Petitioner, DIRECTV, a
11
satellite television provider. Respondents signed DIRECTV’s
12
Customer Agreement (“Agreement”). DIRECTV assessed early
13
termination fees after Imburgia canceled her service contract. On
September 17, 2008, Imburgia filed a class action complaint in
California against DIRECTV, claiming the company charged
14
improper early termination fees. Imburgia sought declaratory relief
and damages for unjust enrichment, false advertising, and violations
of three California statutes, including the Consumer Legal Remedies
15
Act (“CLRA”).
Two provisions within DIRECTV’s Agreement governed the
16
terms of service and the resolution of disputes. Section 10 contained
9. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
10. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
11. Joint Appendix at 59–60, Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014) (No. B239361).
12. Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 192.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Imburgia alleged DIRECTV violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act
(“CLRA”) CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1756 (West 2015), the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200–17210 (West 2015), and the California Civil Code, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1671(d) (West 2015).
16. Id.
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a choice of law provision specifying that the contract would be
“governed by the rules and regulations of the Federal
Communications Commission, other applicable federal laws, and the
laws of the state and local area where Service is provided to [the
17
18
customer].” Imburgia’s service was supplied in California, making
19
California law applicable. Section 9 provided that parties would
20
resolve disputes solely by arbitration. Arbitration would be
“governed by the Federal Arbitration Act” and parties waived rights
to “arbitrate any claim as a representative member of a class or in a
21
private attorney general capacity.” Section 9(c)(ii) (hereinafter “the
poison pill clause”) stated that if “the law of your state would find this
agreement to dispense with class arbitration procedures
22
unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is unenforceable.”
When Imburgia signed the Agreement, certain class action
waivers were “unconscionable . . . and should not be enforced” under
23
California common law. Thus, DIRECTV did not raise arbitration as
24
one of its seventeen affirmative defenses. In 2010, the Supreme
Court ruled in AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion that the FAA
preempted California’s law against class arbitration waivers in
25
adhesion contracts. DIRECTV thereby moved in superior court to
26
compel arbitration. The court, however, denied the motion, citing the
27
specific invocation of state law in § 10. The California Court of
28
Appeal affirmed DIRECTV’s interlocutory appeal and the
29
California Supreme Court denied review. DIRECTV appealed and
30
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether “a

17. Id.
18. Id. at 341.
19. Brief for the Respondents at 2, DIRECTV, Inc. v Imburgia, No. 14-462 (U.S. Mar. 23,
2015) [hereinafer “Brief for the Respondents”].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2–3.
23. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
24. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 6.
25. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. An adhesion contract is a “standard-form contract
prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position . . . with little choice
about the terms.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (10th ed. 2014).
26. Imburgia v. DirecTV Inc., NO. BC398295, 2012 WL 7657788, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 12, 2012).
27. Id.
28. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
29. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 5.
30. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (2015).
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reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the
[FAA] requires that the application of state law be preempted by the
31
[FAA].”
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption
The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, which provides for the supremacy of
32
federal law over state law.
Congress may therefore
33
“preempt, i.e., invalidate, a state law through federal legislation.”
34
Preemption may be express or implicit. Implicit preemption includes
field preemption, when Congress “foreclose[s] any state regulation in
35
the area,” and conflict preemption, when “compliance with both
36
state and federal law is impossible.” Conflict preemption occurs
when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
37
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Any state
38
laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law” are invalid.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act in Context
The Federal Arbitration Act is a “liberal federal policy favoring
39
arbitration.” Recognizing the “costliness and delays of litigation,” the
FAA was “motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to
40
enforce agreements into which parties had entered.” Congress
specifically intended for the FAA to prevent states from undermining
41
arbitration agreements. It conferred a singular right to enforce
42
arbitration agreements and nothing further. Congress stacked the
deck so greatly in favor of arbitration that the Supreme Court wrote
in unambiguous terms:

31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015) (No. 14-462).
32. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
33. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (2015).
34. Id.
35. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
36. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989).
37. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
38. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985).
39. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924).
41. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
42. See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (“It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts.”).

FRIEDMAN FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/26/2016 12:46 PM

PREEMPTION OF CALFIRONIA’S UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE

25

The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
43
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.

Although arbitration proceedings have grown increasingly complex
44
since Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, the Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted the FAA as favoring the enforcement of
45
arbitration.
46
Under the FAA, arbitration is a matter of contract. Like other
contracts, privately negotiated arbitration agreements are enforced
47
according to the terms of the instrument. Section 2 is the “primary
48
substantive provision” and states that an arbitration agreement
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
49
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” The
final clause of this section, known as the “savings clause,” limits the
type of defenses that may make arbitration agreements
50
unenforceable.
The savings clause allows a party to invalidate an arbitration
51
agreement based on grounds generally applicable to “any contract.”
The clause therefore solely provides for those defenses which apply
generally under contract law, such as fraud, duress, or
52
unconscionability. Defenses that do not apply to “any contract” are
53
54
barred. This includes “defenses that apply only to arbitration”

43. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.
44. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (“[C]lass
arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA in 1925.”). For a
concise explanation of the evolution of federal arbitration since 1925, see JON O.
SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 288 (2010)
(stating that Congress’s “national policy favoring arbitration required ambiguity . . . to be
resolved in favor of arbitrability”); see also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (stating
that the FAA’s preemption of conflicting state law was “well-established” and “repeatedly
reaffirmed”).
46. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
48. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.
49. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
50. Id.
51. See id. (emphasis added).
52. Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
53. See id. at 686–87 (emphasizing that defenses must apply to any, or every, contract).
54. Id. at 687.
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because Congress intended to put arbitration “upon the same footing
55
as other contracts.” Thus, federal law prohibited the courts from
56
“singling out” arbitration provisions as suspect. Although generally
applicable contract defenses may make an arbitration agreement
57
unenforceable, they must not “interfere with . . . federal law.”
C. The Modern Doctrine: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court considered
whether the FAA prohibits states from conditioning the
enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of
58
classwide arbitration procedures. Under a similar set of facts to
those in Imburgia, Vincent Concepcion signed an arbitration
agreement which contained a waiver requiring parties to dispute in
their “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any
59
purported class or representative proceeding.” Concepcion, however,
opposed arbitration, arguing that the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court rendered class arbitration
60
waivers in adhesion contracts unconscionable. In that case,
California held that because class arbitration waivers are
61
“indisputably” and “unfairly” one-sided, they are invalid.
62
The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia considered the analysis straightforward—conflicting state rules
63
were displaced by the FAA. Scalia continued:
Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable
contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve statelaw rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
55. H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924).
56. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); see also Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (stating that Congress enacted the FAA to embody
the national policy that arbitration agreements are on equal footing with other contracts).
57. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985).
58. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
59. Id. at 1744.
60. Id. at 1745; see generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal.
2005) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2015)) (“[W]hen the [class action] waiver is found
in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another.’”).
61. Id. at 1108.
62. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
63. Id. at 1787.
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FAA’s objectives. As we have said, a federal statute’s saving clause
‘‘‘cannot in reason be construed as [allowing] a common law right,
the continued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent
with the provisions of the act. In other words, the act cannot be
64
held to destroy itself.’”

Therefore, otherwise permissible defenses may be preempted if they
interfere with the FAA or its interests in promoting “streamlined
65
proceedings and expeditious results.” Justice Scalia further wrote
that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interfere[d]
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create[d] a
66
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.” Hence, the Court held that the
FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule and
67
unconscionability doctrine.
D. California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act and the New Limits on
Unconscionability
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) prohibits
“unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
68
practices.” As a consumer protection statute, the CLRA states that
any individual entitled to bring any action under the CLRA may also
69
bring their claims as a class action suit. To this effect, the CLRA
70
creates a statutory right to class action litigation. Section 1751 of the
CLRA is an “antiwaiver provision” that reads: “Any waiver by a
consumer of the provisions of [the CLRA] is contrary to public policy
71
and shall be unenforceable and void.”
64. Id. at 1748 (citations omitted).
65. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008).
66. Id. at 1748. The Court relied on predominantly practical concerns in discussing why
class arbitration was “inconsistent” with the FAA. Justice Scalia wrote:
“[T]he ‘changes brought about by the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action
arbitration’ are ‘fundamental.’ This is obvious as a structural matter: Classwide
arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures
and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And while it is
theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the classcertification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the oftendominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.
The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured
by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”
Id. at 1750 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686
(2010)).
67. Id. at 1744.
68. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 2015).
69. Id. § 1781.
70. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 831 (2015).
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 2015).
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Since Imburgia was initially decided, the doctrine of
72
unconscionability under California law has changed. In SonicCalabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, however, California’s high court
continued to assert unconscionability as a valid defense to
73
enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Under the FAA’s savings
clause, California claimed an uninterrupted right to apply
unconscionability to arbitration agreements that were “unreasonably
74
harsh, oppressive, or one-sided.” The court therefore interpreted
Concepcion as barring only “facial” and “as-applied” discrimination
75
76
against arbitration. This included the CLRA’s antiwaiver provision.
Because the provision made class arbitration waivers unenforceable,
the court in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC subsequently
77
reasoned it disfavored arbitration and was preempted.
III. HOLDING
In Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., the California Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment below and held that the Agreement did not
78
require arbitration. The court reasoned the FAA merely compelled
79
enforcement of contracts “in accordance with the terms thereof.”
Not enforcing arbitration was therefore “fully consistent” with the
FAA because the parties had freely contracted to resolve disputes
72. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d 269, 289 (2013) (“What is
new is that Concepcion clarifies the limits the FAA places on state unconscionability rules as
they pertain to arbitration agreements.”).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Concepcion court notably used broader terms than those articulated by the
California high court. Nowhere in either the majority opinion nor Justice Breyer’s dissent do
“facial” or “as-applied” discrimination appear. Rather, the Court’s holding speaks of
“obstacle[s] to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Any instance of as-applied
discrimination would likely constitute an obstacle, but it remains unclear whether something
may be an obstacle without “discriminating” against arbitration. The Concepcion court’s ruling
therefore may still prohibit more than the California rule. See AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
76. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 832 (2015).
77. Id.
78. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); The
California Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Murphy v.
DIRECTV, Inc., which reached an opposite conclusion after reviewing the same provision. In
that case, the Ninth Circuit granted DIRECTV’s motion to compel arbitration, considering
arguments of contract interpretation “largely irrelevant.” The Murphy court stated that
California’s ban on class arbitration waivers had been preempted by Concepcion, wherein
federal law became the law of the states. There could be no conflict between them and the
poison pill clause was to be viewed under § 2 of the FAA. See 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013).
79. Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194 (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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80

under “the law of [the customer’s] state.” In Imburgia, California law
had triggered the poison pill clause, invalidating the arbitration
81
agreement. The court deemed this permissible because the FAA had
82
allowed the parties to “opt-out” of its default rules in some respects,
83
even if “state rules would yield a different result from . . . the FAA.”
Thus, the California Court of Appeal concluded that parties could
contract to use California law regardless of the FAA’s preemptive
84
effect.
Enforcing the Agreement by its terms, the court considered
Section 9 unenforceable because the poison pill clause was excepted
85
from the Agreement’s general adoption of the FAA. The court
maintained that under well-settled principles of contract
interpretation, when a specific and a general term conflict, the specific
86
controls the general and defines its meaning. The issue of enforcing
class arbitration waivers was thus considered under California law
because the poison pill clause expressly stated it was governed by the
87
law of the customer’s state. California’s CLRA held waivers of class
arbitration unconscionable, but federal law would have permitted
88
such a provision. The general and specific terms conflicted, but the
89
parties had opted to resolve the issue under state law. The court held
that this invoked the poison pill clause, thereby making Section 9’s
90
arbitration agreement unenforceable.
The court found further support for denying DIRECTV’s motion
because ambiguities are ordinarily construed against the drafter, in
91
this case, DIRECTV. The Agreement was unclear insofar as it could
be interpreted to demand FAA preemption despite a freely

80. Id. at 193.
81. Id. at 194.
82. Id.
83. Id. The court’s analysis relied heavily on Volt to reach its decision. In Volt, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote while the FAA was designed to facilitate arbitration, the “principal
purpose [was] to ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their
terms.” Parties therefore did not undermine the Act by “[structuring] their arbitration
agreements as they [saw] fit.” 489 U.S. at 478–79.
84. Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195.
85. Id; see supra Part I (discussing the Agreement’s invocation of the FAA under Section
10, which subjected the parties to “applicable federal laws”).
86. Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 195.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 197.
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negotiated and explicit choice of law provision to the contrary. As
the non-drafting party, Imburgia was entitled to her reasonable
93
interpretation. The poison pill clause therefore remained in effect
94
and the court ruled that DIRECTV could not compel arbitration.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. DIRECTV’s Arguments
DIRECTV argues that the FAA preempts and invalidates
95
California’s law against class arbitration waivers. According to
DIRECTV, Congress precluded states from refusing to enforce
arbitration agreements when it created a body of substantive federal
96
law of arbitrability. Under this policy, ambiguities as to the scope of
97
the arbitration clause are resolved in favor of arbitration. This
includes ambiguities concerning the applicability of “inconsistent”
98
state law. Although DIRECTV notes the interpretation of
99
arbitration agreements is generally a matter of state law, DIRECTV
claims that the FAA provides an exception when state law is
100
inconsistent with federal arbitration law. DIRECTV thus argues
that under the FAA, courts are required to rigorously enforce
101
arbitration agreements according to their terms. This is necessary,
DIRECTV adds, because the FAA’s substantive federal arbitration
law “serves as an important check on the application of state law,
102
safeguarding the parties’ federal arbitration rights.”
DIRECTV reasons that the Court of Appeal thus erred in holding
103
that it could not compel arbitration. It argues that the Court of
Appeal based its decision on “a legal nullity” and wrongly applied
104
well-settled rules of contract interpretation.
DIRECTV first
outlines that the court recognized a conflict between the Act’s general

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 198, n.5.
Id.
Id. at 198.
Brief for Petitioner at 10, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, No. 14-462 (U.S. May 29, 2015).
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 21–22.
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adoption of the FAA and the poison pill clause’s specific reference to
105
“the law of [the customer’s] state.” In DIRECTV’s view, however,
insofar as state law is separate, it is never immune from the ordinary
106
preemptive effect of federal law. Therefore, federal law becomes the
law of the states and the Court of Appeal interpreted a conflict when,
107
in fact, the provisions were completely harmonized.
Second,
DIRECTV states that the court construed ambiguities in contract
108
interpretation in favor of the non-drafting party. To the extent that
such a construction could apply, DIRECTV argues that it conflicts
with the requirement that ambiguities be resolved in favor of
109
arbitration.
DIRECTV acknowledges that the FAA permits enforcement of
110
arbitration agreements according to their terms. The Agreement,
DIRECTV states, represented an “unmistakable” intent to arbitrate
111
except when the relevant state law would force class arbitration.
Under § 10(b), the parties explicitly adopted the FAA as the
governing authority under, providing that the Agreement “shall be
112
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Therefore, according to
DIRECTV, the parties reasonably expected the contract to be
113
interpreted under the FAA. In any event, because state law is never
immune from federal preemption, the CLRA’s antiwaiver provision
114
carried the force of law that had been repealed, i.e., no force at all.
Although the FAA does not prevent parties from contracting to abide
by nullified law, DIRECTV argues that no such terms appeared in the
115
Agreement. As a matter of private contract, DIRECTV claims that
the court should have interpreted the Agreement by its terms as
116
compelling arbitration under the FAA.
DIRECTV therefore argues that the Court should reverse the
117
judgment below.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 24.
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B. Imburgia’s Arguments
Imburgia argues that the Court of Appeal was correct to apply
California law because interpreting the FAA as barring enforcement
118
of applicable state law is “unprecedented.” Imburgia therefore
contends that the FAA requires the result reached by the Court of
119
Appeal. First, Imburgia argues the FAA compels enforcement of
120
agreements by their terms. Second, the FAA does not prevent
121
parties from forming binding contracts under state law. As a result,
Imburgia concludes that the FAA does not express a federal policy
that necessarily compels construction of any ambiguity in favor of
122
arbitration. Rather, according to Imburgia, arbitration agreements
are enforced “like other contracts” according to their terms and the
123
intentions of the parties.
Imburgia further states that contracts should not be enforced in
124
contravention of the parties’ intention. For this reason, Imburgia
claims that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion preempted California
law only because it “overrode the parties’ own agreement with
125
respect to a central element of the arbitral proceedings.” In
Imburgia’s view, the Court did not invalidate Discover Bank v.
Superior Court because it was an obstacle to a federal policy favoring
arbitration, but because it required class arbitration contrary to the
126
parties’ intentions. The Discover Bank rule thus conflicted with
enforcement according to the terms of the contract as required by the
127
FAA and was subject to preemption.
Imburgia also contends that the Court of Appeal’s judgment
should stand because it correctly interpreted the terms of the contract
128
as invoking California law. Imburgia argues that even if the court
interpreted “the law of [the customer’s] state” to include the
preemptive effect of federal law, the FAA preempts only
118. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 11.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 11–12.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 12.
123. Id. at 15 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995)).
124. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 15–16 (recognizing the role that
parties intentions have played in interpretation of contract agreements, notably where the result
does not favor arbitration).
125. Id. at 16.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 16–17.
128. Id. at 17.
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“requirements imposed by positive state law that would override the
129
parties’ own agreement.” Therefore, Imburgia claims the FAA may
invalidate a conflicting state law but does not limit parties’ from a
130
choice to incorporate California’s antiwaiver provision. Imburgia
thus concludes that the FAA seeks to enforce contracts according to
131
the terms as intended.
Imburgia rejects DIRECTV’s argument that the FAA preempts
California’s invalidation of class arbitration waivers and instead
argues that the Agreement ought to be enforced under state law as
132
both parties intended. According to Imburgia, the FAA has never
required preemption because it permits parties to contract using state
133
law and compels enforcement “according to the terms.” Imburgia
adds that the Agreement in question included the poison pill clause so
134
that it could be used nationwide for all customers. In doing so,
Imburgia claims the poison pill clause inherently recognized that
“certain provisions [would] apply in some states but not others,”
showing that state law had been explicitly incorporated and it was the
135
intent of the parties to be governed by state law. Thus, the
Agreement was appropriately enforced under the law of California
136
because the FAA did not preempt the parties’ choice.
Finally, Imburgia contends that Concepcion is distinguishable
because, unlike the present case, the Concepcion agreement never
137
incorporated California law. Instead, one party merely challenged
138
enforcement of the arbitration clause. Imburgia claims Concepcion
held that California’s law was preempted only because the parties had
139
not agreed to be bound by it. Imburgia states the Court therefore
did not establish a substantive ban on class arbitration waivers

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 21 (quoting Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 303
(2010)).
132. Id. at 23.
133. See id. at 21–22 (arguing that the Court explicitly rejected the notion that the FAA
does not permit application of state law in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 471 (1989)).
134. Id. at 23.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 25.
138. See id. (“[T]he plaintiffs argued that California law overrode the terms of the
agreement.”)
139. See id. (“As DIRECTV explains, Concepcion's actual holding is that ‘state law
cannot force people to arbitrate on a classwide basis.’”).
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140

because Concepcion dealt with a different issue altogether.
Imburgia therefore requests that the Court affirm the judgment
141
below.
V. ANALYSIS
The California Court of Appeal’s decision is flawed for several
reasons. First, the plain meaning of the Agreement requires the court
to enforce arbitration. Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion prohibits state courts from
interpreting class arbitration waivers against arbitration. Third, the
California court’s ruling creates a negative right against arbitration, in
contravention of clearly stated congressional objectives and public
policy. For these reasons, the court erred in finding the arbitration
clause unenforceable.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Agreement Requires the Court to
Enforce Arbitration
The plain meaning of the Agreement resolves the issue raised in
Imburgia in favor of enforcement. This conclusion is inescapable
because the Agreement must be read with respect to federal law,
which renders the unconscionability doctrine in this case invalid.
Through the FAA, Congress established federal regulations for
142
enforcing arbitration agreements across the United States in order
to put arbitration “upon the same footing as other contracts, where it
143
144
belongs.” All such agreements fall within its scope. This includes
agreements to be governed by state law principles, because those
145
terms are only given effect under § 4 of the FAA. Similarly,
arbitration agreements may be held unenforceable using only
generally applicable contract defenses to the extent they are
146
authorized under the savings clause of § 2. Therefore, as the Court
of Appeal agrees, parties to an arbitration agreement can never fully

140. Id.
141. Id. at 46.
142. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012)).
143. H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924).
144. See Federal Arbitration Act § 1 (defining the broad scope of the FAA).
145. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
146. Id.
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147

“opt-out” of federal regulation. Rather, federal regulation provides
148
the underlying framework for all arbitration.
Although the Federal Arbitration Act may give effect to
compatible state law, nothing in it suggests an intent to accommodate
149
conflicting doctrine. This is because, as a general principle, “[an] act
150
cannot be held to destroy itself.” State law which would have such
an effect on a federal act is preempted under the Supremacy Clause
151
and invalid.
The
Court
of Appeal’s
application
of
California’s
unconscionability doctrine would destroy federal implementation of
the FAA. It would sanction courts’ disfavoring arbitration and could
152
halt enforcement of agreements in California. This is prohibited.
Similarly, the court’s reading further interferes with Congress’s intent
153
to put arbitration “upon the same footing as other contracts.” The
154
state, however, is barred from interfering with a federal program.
Thus, the court’s ruling attempts to use its authority to interpret
contracts as a means of circumventing federal preemption. Under the
155
Supremacy Clause, this is unconstitutional.
The poison pill clause states that if “the law of [the customer’s]
state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration
procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is
156
unenforceable.” In interpreting this provision, the court may not
adopt a view which is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal’s reading
was unconstitutional because it disfavored arbitration and
157
circumvented preemption. This rendered the unconscionability
doctrine invalid against the arbitration agreement. Having no other
basis under federal or state law not to enforce the Agreement, the
Court of Appeal should have compelled arbitration.
147. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
148. Id.
149. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2012).
150. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227–228 (1998)).
151. See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008) (stating the FAA preempted
otherwise permissible state laws governing arbitration that interfered with its functions).
152. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(prohibiting courts from disfavoring arbitration).
153. H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924).
154. Preston, 552 U.S. at 357–58.
155. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
156. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 19, at 2–3.
157. See Moses, 460 U.S. at 24 (stating that courts should, as a matter of federal law, resolve
“any doubts” concerning the scope of arbitration in favor of arbitration).
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B. Concepcion Prohibits State Courts from Interpreting Waivers
Against Arbitration
The issue in Concepcion was whether the FAA prohibits States
from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements
on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures. The Court
found that § 2 preempted California’s rule against class arbitration
158
waivers. In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, California had adopted
a rule against class arbitration waivers in adhesion contracts because
159
Concepcion
they are “indisputably” and “unfairly” one-sided.
invalidated Discover Bank on the grounds that it “interfere[d] with
160
arbitration.”
Concepcion’s precedent thereby became binding.
Under the Supremacy Clause, the California Court of Appeal had no
161
authority to undermine a Supreme Court ruling. The message of
Concepcion was twofold: interpret arbitration agreements in favor of
162
arbitration and do not obstruct federal arbitration. The Court of
Appeal ignored both.
The California court further refused to enforce the agreement
against conventional wisdom of contract interpretation—to interpret
163
contracts as valid rather than invalid. Instead, the Court chose to
interpret the arbitration agreement “against the drafter,” a canon of
construction rooted in the same rationales of unfairness as Discover
164
Bank. In this way, the court’s choice to interpret terms against the
drafter merely repackages Discover Bank toward the same result.
Claims that arbitration agreements are generally “unfair” were
165
foreclosed by Congress’s choice to enforce arbitration. The court’s
interpretation in Imburgia was therefore unreasonable and suggests
its motives were improper.
Finally, the facts of Concepcion and Imburgia are not materially
distinguishable. In both cases, one party challenged the enforcement
158. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
159. 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005).
160. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
161. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (affirming federal supremacy).
162. Id. at 1749.
163. See generally, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 228–29 (indicating that
interpretations making a contract lawful and enforceable are preferred over interpretations that
render part or all of the contract unenforceable, illegal, or unreasonable and result in
forefeiture).
164. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) (“The
reason for this rule is to protect the party who did not choose the language from an unintended
or unfair result.”).
165. See supra Part II.B.
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of arbitration that lacked classwide arbitration procedures.
Although the Agreement in Imburgia invoked state law in the poison
pill clause, there was no valid basis under state law to render the
167
contract unenforceable. The inclusion of a poison pill clause thus
holds no bearing on the Court’s reasoning. Rather, the Court’s ruling
in Concepcion addressed a broader issue that common law
unconscionability of arbitration could not stand as an obstacle to
168
federal policy. The Discover Bank rule and the CLRA’s antiwaiver
provision are mere refinements of California’s unconscionability
doctrine and thus fall squarely within the Court’s ruling. After
Concepcion, such defenses were barred. Under the Supremacy Clause,
the Court of Appeal decision is invalid because it is contrary to
169
Concepcion.
C. The Court of Appeal’s Decision Confers a Negative Right to
Breach Arbitration Agreements Against Public Policy
California courts are further precluded from applying
unconscionability to class arbitration waivers because doing so
170
confers a negative right to breach agreements. Such a right would be
against public policy. Congress enacted the FAA to provide
“streamlined proceedings and expeditious results” as an alternative to
171
litigation. As part of this regime, Congress provided individuals with
a remedy at law to ensure agreements would be enforced “according
172
to the terms thereof” and on the “same footing” as any other
173
174
contract. This was the only right the FAA conferred.
The Court of Appeal’s interpretation, however, confers a negative
right against arbitration and stands as an obstacle to federal

166. Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (addressing
a challenge to an arbitration agreement absent classwide arbitration procedures under
California’s unconscionability doctrine), with Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d
190, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (considering a challenge to an arbitration agreement not
precluded because the parties specifically agreed to be governed by California’s
unconscionability doctrine).
167. See supra Part II.A.
168. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
169. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (affirming federal supremacy).
170. A negative right is a “right entitling a person to have another refrain from doing an act
that might harm the person entitled.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1519 (10th ed. 2014).
171. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008).
172. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
173. H.R. REP. NO. 96-68, at 1 (1924).
174. See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (“It creates no new legislation, grants no new rights,
except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts.”).
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implementation. This negative right enables a party to breach a
contract solely because it deems the form of arbitration unfair, despite
a clear agreement to arbitrate. Were the Supreme Court to adopt this
view, it would sanction the breach and open the door for other states
to do the same. These breaches, however, are against public policy
because they undermine the expectations of parties when drafting
and would have a chilling effect on negotiations. They also give
preference to the choice of some parties over others based on
location. As a result, parties would be unable to predict how a court
would interpret an agreement and transactional costs would increase
since parties would be drawn into court to enforce the negative right.
Furthermore, a party would have to factor those costs into the price of
service, potentially resulting in higher rates for customers nationally
175
or different pricing between localities. Most importantly, it would
conflict with Congress’s clear public policy favoring the enforcement
176
of arbitration.
Finally, it is unclear whether parties’ interests would be better
protected through class action litigation. In class action suits, damages
are frequently high but distributed among a large number of litigants.
The payout may ultimately be small. In contrast, individual arbitration
procedures often promise individuals guaranteed payouts and
177
subsidize the costs of attorneys fees. This is in exchange for caps on
total damages. Such a procedure protects concerns of both parties and
facilitates an equitable settlement. Thus, individual arbitration may
provide claimants with more benefits than would class litigation. The
Court should therefore reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision in the
interest of public policy.

175. Although the FAA does not prohibit any discriminatory pricing, Congress has done so
elsewhere under the Communications Act of 1934. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L.
No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, § 201 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)); see also Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998) (“[T]he policy of
nondiscriminatory rates is violated when similarly situated customers pay different rates for the
same services.”).
176. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
177. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (“The
agreement, moreover, denies AT & T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees,
and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT & T’s last
written settlement offer, requires AT & T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the
amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.”)
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CONCLUSION
The decision in DIRECTV v. Imburgia largely comes down to
competing views of the Federal Arbitration Act. DIRECTV argues
that the Act preempts and invalidates any state law that frustrates the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Imburgia contends that the
Act compels consideration of arbitration agreements under state law
when those contracts have explicitly and intentionally adopted state
law as the governing authority. To the extent that both interpretations
are plausible, Imburgia’s position would effectively sanction states’
discrimination against arbitration agreements so long as those states
found that the parties invoked hostile state law principles. This
construction plainly frustrates the implementation of § 2 and cannot
be reconciled. The Court should therefore reverse the California
Court of Appeal and, in furtherance of Congress’s objectives, reaffirm
that states are fully preempted from enforcing agreements under state
doctrines that would disfavor arbitration.

